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This is an investigation of the activity detected on three honeypots that utilise the Kippo SSH
honeypot system on VPS servers all on the same C class address. The systems ran on identical
softwarebasesandhardwareconfigurations.Theresultsareovertheperiod21stMarch2013until
Tuesday04June2013.Theinitialanalysiscoveredinthispaperexaminesbehavioursandpatterns






This is an investigation of the activity detected on three honeypots that utilise the Kippo SSH
honeypot system(Tamminen 2013) on VPS servers. The three honeypots were all configured
identicallyallusingUbuntu11serveras theoperatingsystem, identicalhardware intermsofCPU
memory and hard disk. The three honeypotswere all deployed across the same IP version 4 /24














The basic Ubuntu install then had the latest repository code for Kippo installed from






















































libraries to emulate cryptographic functionality that would be found in a normal SSH session
initiation.

Kippo allows an attacking entity to attempt a login to the system believing it is entering into a
legitimate SSH sessionwith the server. Upon successful guessing of the password the attacker is
thenmovedintoafakesystemwithwhichtheycaninteractwith.Inthisfakesystemallinteractions








due to issues in initiation of the faked encrypted session using the twisted module in python
(Code.google.com, 2012). This problem has now been fixed in the current version of Kippo. This















The dictionary based or list basedmethods usewords orwordlists that simply try one password
aftertheotherblindlyagainstthevictimaccountonthetargetsystem.Thespeedofthesemethods
is typically restricted by the available network bandwidth to the target system. In addition to
network speed the target system's ability to cope with multiple connections before a denial of




password strings from a keyboard pattern such as qwerty123456 or combinations thereof.
Customisationofthesewordlistsiscommon,andtherearenumeratecustomisedwordlistsavailable





sometimes sorted sequentially A to Z or Z to A and attempted in this fashion. Chronology and
magnitudeoftheattemptstocompromisetheaccountareindicatorsofbruteforceattack.Astrong
indicator is the intervals between retry of password for example timing that it is not humanly
possible to achieve. Another indicator is the intervals of a login retry that are chronologically
consistentfromthesamehostormultiplehostsasagroupconnecting.

TheotherattackagainstanSSHserverofcourse isone thatutilisesvulnerabilitywhether thatbe
knownorunknown(zeroday)tocauseeitherprivilegeescalationordenialofservice. Itshouldbe
notedthatwhileKippoisahoneypotitisnotmeanttoprovideemulationatthislevel.However,the
honeypots are configuredwith full packet capture allowing post incident analysis for this type of
attack.Analysisviafullpacketcaptureisnotacurrentfocusofthisresearchhowever.
ATTACK OUTCOMES AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERED FROM THREE  
HONEYPOTS 






on identical network links in terms of latency and other critical factors. As best can occur in a
networkedITsystemtheyareidentical. 




















176.31.85.59 25927 176.31.85.59 28565 94.127.2.85 1605
223.4.94.69 13322 173.224.221.197 5310 211.191.168.180 1604
223.4.241.4 10771 46.105.189.201 4703 188.132.206.233 974
74.63.238.68 9507 5.9.200.90 3282 121.9.221.102 974
223.4.171.195 8434 203.93.215.101 2238 211.110.44.113 771
223.4.175.77 6616 94.127.2.85 1605 101.44.1.135 725
59.125.208.244 6097 188.132.206.233 1461 174.140.167.238 603
220.172.107.211 6048 121.9.221.102 974 218.206.117.57 439
201.116.36.180 5777 58.240.17.250 961 74.84.89.106 286
122.158.235.33 4848 114.112.21.15 953 114.80.202.30 275
116.229.239.242 4772 218.206.117.57 854 84.22.32.2 249
223.4.182.71 3535 91.102.16.156 798 31.40.76.183 222
200.214.143.4 3520 166.78.27.149 725 220.161.148.178 216
174.140.167.238 3442 208.115.207.140 627 112.231.23.68 201
188.125.103.177 3211 128.140.1.19 597 124.160.194.27 174
180.168.83.54 3094 220.161.148.178 593 192.157.220.84 169
5.9.200.90 3075 120.101.5.209 546 62.193.192.167 163
223.4.145.38 2888 218.77.178.3 545 63.137.151.184 163
203.69.139.179 2664 59.151.5.236 511 173.208.218.70 161
218.213.234.232 2519 211.191.168.180 449 125.39.8.142 141
Table2Top20ConnectingIPsforHosts

Figure 1 shows the spread of hosts probed by the top 20 attacking IPs for each host. Purposeful
bruteforcescanningisindicatedbythescanningofhostsbytheattackingIPwithterminationofthe
numberofactualloginattemptsatequalcount,thisrepresents11%ofallscannedIPs.Thispattern












which is in contrast to some of the rhetoric, fear, uncertainty and doubt around cyber security
threats. The general assumption touted in the tabloid press is that attacks are numerous and
predominantly from Chinese based hosts. Whilst there is some truth in these statements, this
researchpresentsevidencewhichcontradictsthisviewpoint(Table3).

1 France 30% 6 USA 4% 11 China 3% 16 Unknown 2%
2 China 7% 7 Poland 4% 12 Mexico 3% 17 Korea 2%
3 China 6% 8 China 4% 13 China 3% 18 USA 2%
4 USA 5% 9 Germany 4% 14 China 3% 19 Turkey 2%




emanating from the top 20 attackers. China however, did represent 8 of the top 20 attackers
representing25%ofthevolume,butnotethisisstilllessthanFranceoverall.Therewere9nations





secure it should typically be over 12 characters long and be complex in its construction using a
random combination of letters, digits and punctuation. This complexity would also preclude
dictionary words or simple patterns for example based on a keyboard sequence e.gqwerty or a






















123456 7350 123456 1632 123456 597
password 6204 password 803 password 157
1234 3481 changeme 539 1234 125
changeme 2757 test 421 12345 101
abc123 2592 1234 369 1 90
12345 2414 123 361 123 89
test 2300 12345 311 test 84
123 1904 qwerty 291 root 80
qwerty 1342 admin 279 abc123 70












Once attacking entities had gained access to the honeypot a variety of access was evinced from
clearlyautomated interactions toobviousmanualprobing. Theautomated interactions tendedto
usescriptsthatendeavouredtodownloadpayloadsfromserversanddeploymaliciouscode.

Oneof the featuresof theKippohoneypot is the falsesystemthatallowstheattacker to interact
withthehoneypotsystemastheywouldexpecttowhentheyhavecompromisedarealmachineon
the Internet. The fake systemprovides a limited set of commandswithin the falsemachine. Also
falsemachineinformationisfedviastaticfilesrepresentingasystem.Forinstance/proc/cpuinfowill










ls 110 exit 3 ls 31
w 70 lsal 2 cd.. 14
exit 54 ls 1 exit 11
lsa 43 cat/proc/cpuinfo 1 lsal 6
cd.. 25 cat/etc/issue 1 cd/ 4
unamea 24 lsl 4
rmrf.bash_history 24 lslah 4
echo"WinSCP:thisisendoffile:0" 23 clear 3
lsal 21 lsall 3








the .bash_history file, which is a common technique to hide malicious activity of an attacker.
Typically all interactions on a Linux/UNIX based server dialogue to the .bash_history file. It is
interesting to note that the command given rf –r simply deletes the file. This is of note because
deletingandnoterasingwouldallowingforforensicrecoveryofthefile.

The obvious second attemptwaswhen attacking entities tried tomodify permissions on files by
making every file executable with the chmod +x * command. Interestingly, on Lair the attacking








































Many of the files were variously: rootkits (rk.tgz), denial of service tools (flood.tar), IRC tools
(psyBNC) and compromise replacement binaries (ssh.gz). There was also PDF and JPG files that













Thefirstmisconception is that there iswidespreadautomatedscanningof the Internetbybotsor
automatedscripts typically initiatedbyahumanbeingacrossentirenetworkblocks.Theevidence
acquiredby this research to thispointwould indicate that this isnot the case for themajorityof
attacks.Thesethreeidenticalhostswereonthesamesubnetworkwithvaryinglevelsofprobingand
attack. If there was widespread scanning one would postulate that the top 10 or even top 20
attackingIPsforsuchalongitudinalstudywouldbethesameorexhibithighsimilarity,thishasnot
been the case. However, there are only 4 or 11% of hosts that did scan all three hosts that




is likewise advanced. Some of the behaviours exhibited in this research would indicate that the
attacks are at least persistent but certainly calls into question their advanced nature. There is
however, a word of caution in that these machines were Linux based and not Windowsbased







over just 75 days. The analysis of the data at this stage has been limited to analysing high level
loggingdatarecordedbythehoneypotswithsomeindepthanalysiswhererequired.Therehasnot
been an extensive forensic review of log files and other data thatwas collected in the honeypot
systems at this stage. This data will need further research and development of suitable analysis
techniquesandmethods.Finally,thehoneypotsarestillcollectingdatafromattackersandattimeof
writing had a combined database approaching 1 million attempts, which will require novel
techniquesforlongitudinalanalysis.

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